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Abstract 
The Effect of Delivery Windows on the Variance 
of Flow Time and On-Time Delivery 
2 
A critical outcome that buyers seek is the timely delivery of the products that they 
purchase from suppliers. Delivery windows have been proposed as a means to achieve this 
goal. This paper analyzes the effect of buyer-specified delivery windows on the supplier's 
flow time variance, flow time allowance, inventory, expected tardiness, and probability of 
on-time delivery. The results confirm that using delivery windows may have the effect 
that the supplier's preferred action would be to reduce flow time allowance and variance. 
Whether on-time delivery performance improves is analyzed for linear and exponential 
variance cost functions. The results indicate that when the cost of maintaining lower 
variances grows exponentially, variance reduction does not lead to more timely deliveries. 
1. Introduction 
A delivery window is a period of time, specified by the buyer, in which delivery is 
desired. Deliveries before the delivery window period begins are forbidden. Deliveries 
that occur after the delivery window period are considered tardy, and may be subject to 
penalties. When the delivery occurs within the window the buyer accepts delivery and 
does not impose any penalties. 
The use of delivery windows is documented by Fawcett and Birou [5), Corbett [3), 
and Kumar and Sharman [14). Fawcett and Birou use a Likert scale to assess the degree 
of implementation of various JIT techniques. Use of delivery time windows was ranked 
fourth out of 14 in implementation status. Delivery time windows were implemented at 
a level of 5.10 out of 7, where 7 was described as "fully implemented." The highest level 
of implementation was 5. 79. Long-term partnerships, blanket orders, and supplier certifi-
cation scored higher in level of implementation. They state, " ... the use of [delivery) time 
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windows is viewed as a type of insurance against nonperformance and the cost of failures 
in physical support of JIT sourcing." Reviewing this same data, Fawcett [4] indicates that 
approximately 10% of suppliers surveyed do not use delivery time windows at all. A little 
over 41% are at some stage of implementing delivery windows with some of their carriers 
and suppliers. Close to 48% of the suppliers heavily use them with the majority of their 
carriers and suppliers, and have relatively well defined delivery time windows. 
Corbett [3] describes a case study where the manufacturer quotes an earliest and latest 
delivery date rather than a single due date. The manufacturer supplies office furniture to 
buying firms that install it. These buyers typically operate in a project management 
environment. The early and late start dates for the installation task define the delivery 
window. Corbett states: "delivery windows offer the ability to improve the on-time delivery 
performance or dependability." Capacity smoothing methods using the delivery windows 
are proposed to create a degree of flexibility in scheduling the work. 
Kumar and Sharman [14] indicate that delivery windows at supermarkets have de-
creased from four hours to one hour. They discuss the competitive advantages that suppli-
ers can obtain through on-time delivery and suggest means of achieving on-time delivery. 
Their recommendation is an application of gap analysis [18]. Kumar and Sharman identify 
three causes of gaps between delivery expectations and perceived delivery performance. 
The calibration gap occurs when suppliers and buyers measure and evaluate on-time de-
livery differently. An organization gap indicates a lack of incentives or commitment by 
the supplier to deliver on-time. The operation& gap is the result of highly variable opera-
tions created by complexity in product design, product mix, and supplier processes. The 
variance reduction considered in this paper addresses this operations gap. 
When on-time delivery is critical to operations, two supplier actions are usually as-
sumed to improve delivery timeliness: increasing the flow time allowance (or lead time )t 
t The effectiveness of this response may be limited. The ramifications of increasing lead 
time are discussed by Wight [17]. 
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and reducing the variance of flow time. Of these, many buyers would prefer that suppliers 
reduce variance rather than increase the allowance. Increasing the allowance decreases 
the buyer's flexibility in the short-term, and has the effect of increasing the amount of 
inventory held by the supplier. Kumar and Sharman [14] explicitly indicate that holding 
additional inventory is an undesirable "quick-fix." Decreasing the variance of flow time is 
thought to result in more timely deliveries without these negative side effects. 
On-time delivery is typically critical when buyers choose to implement Just-In-Time 
(JIT). JIT usually involves inventory reduction by the buyer. Without the inventory, late 
deliveries cause the buyer's operations to be very dependent on suppliers to provide on-time 
delivery. In response, some JIT proponents recommend that the supplier also implement 
JIT. Suppliers are discouraged from responding to the buyer's need for on-time delivery 
by holding more inventory. Doing so would defeat the overall purpose of JIT. Inventory 
would simply be relocated to the supplier's warehouse. Relocating inventory, in general, 
does not improve the efficiency of the supply chain as a whole. 
Despite JIT proponents' assertions that suppliers should not hold more inventory, a 
growing body of evidence indicates that they often do. A Wall Street Journal article titled 
"Trucks Become 'Warehouses' for Inventories" states that "trucks have become the place 
of choice for just-in-time stockpiles" [10]. It also suggests that this practice may have an 
impact on the economic recovery of 1994. Inventories in trucks are not included in the 
measures of inventory used to track the progression of the recovery. This practice also 
occurs in Europe. Hill and Vollman [11] state "At one European automobile manufacturer 
we were told of all the great inventory reductions that had been achieved through the 
application of JIT. Later, we saw a large construction project that turned out to be a 
greatly increased parking lot for vendor trucks. The inventory was moved from the factory 
warehouse to semitrailers!" Not all suppliers use trucks. PPG Industries has created an 
industrial park for their suppliers' warehouses [13]. A buyer for PPG Industries states 
"Our company is in the business of producing chemicals-not managing inventory. It's 
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distribution's job to inventory products." Freeland [6) found that nearly half of the single 
source suppliers he surveyed were required to hold safety stock to insure supply. Other 
examples have been documented [1,2,7,12). 
Buyers implementing JIT need a method of getting suppliers to provide on-time de-
livery that is brought about through variance reduction instead of holding inventory. This 
method must take into account how suppliers will respond to it. This paper analyzes how 
a cost-minimizing supplier's response to buyer-specified delivery windows impacts the vari-
ance of flow time, inventory levels, and delivery timeliness. The results are mixed. Using 
delivery windows may have the desired effect of making flow time variance reduction the 
preferred action of suppliers. However, depending on the cost functions associated with 
controlling variance, improved inventory levels and on-time delivery may not result. 
The cost of maintaining a given variance is assumed to be positive and is described 
as a mathematical function of the variance. This function is called the variance cost func-
tion. Two variance cost functions are explored: linear and exponential. Both variance 
cost functions are decreasing with respect to the variance. They increase as variance is 
reduced. The supplier's optimal (cost minimizing) decisions are noticeably different for 
the two variance cost functions. These optimal decisions are compared on five dimensions: 
flow time variance, flow time allowance, inventory, expected tardiness, and probability of 
on-time delivery (see Table 1 ). For both variance cost functions, as the window duration is 
reduced the variance of flow time and flow time allowance decrease. However, the exponen-
tial function leads to increased supplier inventories, lower probabilities of on-time delivery 
and greater average tardiness as the window duration is reduced. For the linear variance 
cost function, the probability of on-time delivery is constant for all window durations, but 
the average tardiness and supplier's inventory decrease as the window duration is reduced. 
The two functions considered here are not intended to be exhaustive. Rather, they 
represent two different views of how cost change as variance is reduced. Timeliness of 
deliveries can be considered to be one aspect of quality. Costs incurred maintaining a 
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low flow time variance can be thought of as part of the prevention component of the cost 
of quality. The two postulated shapes of the prevention cost curve are finite and roughly 
linear, and exponential [15,16). If the prevention cost of quality curve increases in a gradual, 
linear manner to a finite maximum at zero defects, then zero defects may be the lowest 
cost of quality. If the curve grows exponentially approaching zero defects (low variance), 
then the optimal quality level is greater than zero defects. The author's intent is not to 
argue which cost function accurately describes reality, rather it is to suggest that the two 
variance cost functions that have been selected for analysis are those under consideration 
in a broader context of inquiry. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. The second section is the formulation of the 
suppliers total expected cost function with delivery windows. Section three discusses the 
optimal solution when the variance cost function is exponential. Section four discusses the 
optimal solution when the variance cost function is linear. Implications of the results for the 
two variance cost functions and some of the intuitive aspects of the findings are discussed 
in section five. Section five also identifies the limitations of this research. Conclusions and 
directions for ongoing research are given in section six. 
2. Formulation 
The formulation of this problem is a modification of the formulation presented by 
Grout and Christy [8,9) . The formulation differs from these in two respects. First, a 
delivery is considered on-time if the supplier delivers the order during the delivery window. 
In the prior formulations, a delivery was only on-time when it was delivered on the due date. 
No window or tolerance for variation was provided by the buyer. Appropriate incentives 
were created to get the supplier to bear all of the risk associated with flow time variation. 
Using a delivery window, the buyer shares the risk of flow time variation by accepting the • 
cost that result when deliveries are made within the window. The cost that the buyer 
incurs is the holding cost of the inventory that results when shipments are delivered early 
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in the window. Notice, however, that the buyer does not accept all of the risk, the supplier 
bares the risk of :Bow time variation that results from upper and lower tail outcomes. Since 
the supplier experiences cost in the tails of the :Bow time distribution, it is hypothesized 
that using delivery windows will tend to cause the supplier to reduce variation in an effort 
to avoid the cost in either tail. Second, the fixed-value, ali-or-nothing bonus was omitted 
from this formulation in an effort to simplify the mathematics. 
Let 
F = The random variable of :Bow time. Flow time is the duration 
between the start of work and the completion of work on a 
given lot or order. 
A = The :Bow time allowance. The :Bow time allowance is the amount 
of time budgeted for the completion of work on a lot or order. 
The allowance is the difference between the start time and the 
due date. 
g(F) = The probability density function of :Bow time. 
The uniform distribution is used to model :Bow times. 
G( A) = The cumulative distribution function of :Bow time, 
p = the mean :Bow time, 
u2 = the variance of :Bow time, 
R =one half of the range of :Bow time. For the uniform distribution, u 2 = (2~)2. 
Xa(A, u2 ) = The Supplier's expected cost function. 
a= The finished goods holding cost per time period (assumed to be positive). 
f3 =The cost of tardiness per time period (assumed to be positive). 
W =The duration of the window. 
P = The per-time period penalty. The penalty is selected by the 
buyer and is assumed to be non-negative. 
c(u2 ) =The variance cost function. The cost function of maintaining 
a chosen variance. The function is assumed to be decreasing, 
c' ( u2 ) < 0. The smaller the variance that is chosen, the more 
costly the maintenance required. 
8 =The cost parameter of the variance cost function. 
M = The cost of achieving zero variance when the variance cost 
function is a linear function of the range. 
2.1. Trading Scenario and Assumptions 
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The trading scenario between buyer and supplier is a long-term contract between a 
single risk-neutral buyer and a single risk-neutral supplier for multiple deliveries of :fixed 
size lots of a single make-to-order product. The supplier's flow time is stochastic. The 
contract specifies the selling price per unit, duration of the window, and late penalty. The 
penalty is collected at the time that delivery occurs and is assumed to be positive and 
proportional to the amount of time that the order is tardy. The timing and quantity of 
demand is assumed to be known sufficiently early to allow the supplier to freely select 
when to initiate production and, hence, the flow time allowance. No expedited, or rush 
orders are necessary. The supplier manufactures products on a make-to-order basis. The 
supplier must decide when to initiate work on the buyer's order so that delivery will occur 
within the delivery window. 
In this paper, the buyer's option to hold inventory and the supplier's option to do 
business elsewhere are not modelled explicitly. It is assumed that the supplier will not do 
business if delivery windows and contractual penalties reduce expected profits below some 
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minimum acceptable expected profit. Likewise, if the costs of achieving on-time delivery 
are too high, the buyer will use alternative methods of achieving the desired service level. 
These alternatives include holding inventory or vertically integrating. 
2.2. Supplier's Optimization Problem 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the distribution of fiow time, the allowance, 
and the delivery window. When an order is completed before the window, A - W > F, 
the order is completed early and is held by the supplier. The expression (A- W)- F is 
the duration that inventory must be held. If A < F, then the duration that the order is 
tardy is F - A. The supplier's expected relevant cost function is 
rA-W rex> 
X 6 (A, u 2 ) = o· Jo [(A- W)-F] ·g(F)dF+(!1+P)· }A (F-A)·g(F)dF+c(u2). {1) 
Two variance cost functions c(u2 ) are considered. The exponential cost function is 
formulated as c( u2 ) = :, = ~~. This function is convex and approaches infinite cost as the 
variance approaches zero. The other cost function that is considered increases as a linear 
function of the range to a maximum, M. This cost function is c( u2 ) = M-(} R. Flow times 
are assumed to be uniformly distributed. This assumptions allows mathematical results 
to be determined for the two variance cost functions. The generality of these results is 
considered in section five. 
3. Exponential Variance Cost Function 
The variance cost function increases exponentially as the variance approaches zero. 
For a specific instance where the fiow time is uniformly distributed and the variance cost 
function exponential, equation {1) can be restated as 
l A-W 1 j"+R 1 3(} X 6 (A,R)=o· [(A-W)-F]·-dF+(P+P)· (F-A)·-dF+-2 • {2) ~~-R 2R A 2R R 
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The optimal solution is found by taking the derivative with respect to A and R, and 
solving the equations that result from setting the derivatives equal to zero. The optimal 
allowance and range for the exponential variance cost function are labelled AE andRE, 
and given below: 
A = + W- W(.B + P) _ ai(,B + P)iW2 
E J.l a+.B+P 2·3i~ 
ai(,B + P)t W2 (.8 + P)~- ~(a+ .8 + P) + + -=----=-----=:------






~ = [216(a + .8 + P)B + v'3)15552(P(a + .8 + P)2- a2W2(,8 + P)2] 3 . (5) 
The supplier's expected cost function is convex. The analysis of the Hessian matrix 
that shows that this solution results in minimum cost is provided in the appendix. 
The supplier's optimal decision is a function of the duration of the window, W. The 
effect of the window duration on the supplier's optimal selection of A and R can be shown 
graphically. Figure 2 shows how the flow time distribution changes as the duration of the 
window changes for a specific set of parameter values. The shape of the curves shown does 
not change dramatically when the parameters change. For instance, the curve J.l + RE is 
convex and approaches AE from above as W increases. These characteristic exist for any 
parameter values within the assumed ranges. The curve showing J.l- RE is concave and 
approaches AE- W from below. The range of the uniform distribution of flow time always 
exceeds the duration of the delivery window. The variance and allowance decrease. 
As the window duration decreases, the bounds of the distribution bend away from 
the delivery window. The buyer's order could be completed at J.l- RE and be held by 
the supplier as inventory until AE- W. Asp- RE and AE- W move further apart, it 
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indicates that the expected amount of time inventory is held by the supplier will increase. 
The supplier will hold inventory longer. At the same time, The distance between p + RE 
and AE increases. For the supplier, this means that the duration that jobs are tardy 
increases as W decreases. The probability of tardy delivery is 
(6) 
As W decreases, the probability of a tardy delivery increases. The probability of on-time 
delivery decreases. More deliveries will be late. 
As the window is reduced the variance is also reduced, yet more deliveries are late. 
This result occurs because the variance cost function increases rapidly. With increases in 
the costs of maintaining variance, holding inventory and allowing more orders to be late 
become more cost-effective alternatives. When W = 0, the slopes of the bounds of the 
distribution are zero. All of the orders are either held in inventory for some period of time 
or are late. The optimal proportion of on-time deliveries can be increased by increasing 
the late penalty, P. When W = 0, the optimal probability of on- time delivery G(A) can 
be shown to satisfy the following equation: 
G(A) = f3+P 
o:+f3+P (7) 
Prior to implementing delivery windows, a buyer has a delivery window where W ~ A. 
This means that an order can be delivered as soon as it is completed. Implementing delivery 
windows involves reducing the window duration over time. As this reduction occurs for the 
exponential cost function, the inventory levels and delivery timeliness deteriorate; however, 
the length of the allowance and the variance of flow time continue to decrease. 
4. Linear Variance Cost Function 
The linear variance cost function is defined as c( u2 ) = M -9 R. The supplier's expected 
cost equation is the same as (2), except for the third term. The optimal solution is also 
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found using the same methods used in the exponential case. The optimal allowance and 
range for the linear variance cost function are labelled At and Rt: 
A (P) = W- W(f' + P) [-a + {1 + pl W 
t p,+ o:+f'+P+ o:+f'+P 2 
o:(f' + P) (8) 
o:(f' + P)- 8(o: + {1 + P)' 
and 
o:(f' + P) (9) 
o:(f' + P)- 8(o: + {1 + P). 
In the this case, the supplier's expected cost function is convex. The Hessian matrix 
is shown to be positive semi-definite in the appendix indicating that the optimal solution 
is a minimum. However, the solution is a real number only when 8 is relatively small. 
When o:(f' + P) - ·lJ(o: + {1 + P) is non-positive, (8) and (9) either involve division by zero 
or result in an imaginary number. Variance reduction will not remain attractive when the 
marginal cost of that reduction is large. For At and Rt to be real, 
(10) 
The value of 8 is assumed to be sufficiently small to result in real values of (8) and (9) in 
the remainder of the paper. 
Figure 3 shows how the flow time distribution changes as the duration of the window 
changes with a linear variance cost function. The allowance and range are linear functions 
of W. Moreover, the slopes of these lines result in the proportion of late orders remaining 
constant with respect toW. The probability of on-time delivery is 
G( A) = {1 + p + -----;=0 =:==::;:== 
0 + f' + P (a+ f' + P) a(P+A<!~=~IJ+P) (11) 
Notice that (11) does not include W. Although managers would like the proportion of 
late orders to decrease, for the linear variance cost function the proportion is constant in 
W. However, when an order is late, the expected tardiness is reduced. The length of time 
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inventory must be held by the buyer and supplier also decrease. So although the proportion 
of late deliveries does not decrease, ~he severity and thus the cost of late deliveries and 
holding inventory do decrease. 
5. Implications, Intuition, and Limitations 
The supplier's actions are very different for the two variance cost functions that have 
been examined. These differences can be seen by examining Figure 2 and Figure 3. 
In some ways the comparison of linear and exponential variance cost functions mirrors 
the discussion in quality management literature about the optimal defect level. When the 
prevention curve is linear with moderate slope, zero defects is the optimal quality level. 
When the variance cost function is linear, reducing W to zero continues to have the desired 
effect of simultaneously improving most performance measures and not harming any. The 
exponential prevention curve leads to a trade-off in cost of quality that yields a optimal 
level of quality that allows some defects to be tolerated. The exponential variance cost 
function leads to a trade off between low variance and higher probability of late deliveries 
that suggest W > 0 may be best. 
Reducing the delivery window may make variance reduction the most attractive action 
for the supplier, but that variance reduction does not always lead to achieving on-time 
delivery. This research shows that the variance cost function has an important impact on. 
whether implementing delivery windows will actually improve the timeliness of orders. 
In those case where windows do not achieve the desired on-time delivery performance, 
the buyer faces a dilemma. Should the variance be reduced to improve the efficiency of the 
supply chain or should a high variance be permitted in exchange for more timely delivery? 
The buyer may trade off between these two objectives by selecting a duration where the 
bounds of the distribution have not diverged from the window too much yet where the · 
variance is acceptably small. An alternate approach would be to use delivery windows to 
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manage supplier variance and to use monetary incentives like the penalty P to achieve the 
desired probability of on-time delivery and expected tardiness. 
The results of this paper are shown only for uniformly distributed flow times. The 
equations describing optimal supplier behavior would be different for other flow time distri-
butions. The results shown here do not fully characterize the optimal behavior of suppliers; 
however, some findings would hold for a variety of flow time distributions. 
Some findings that hold for other flow time distributions when the variance cost func-
tion is exponential follow. When W = 0, the variance will not be zero. This is true 
because 
lim c( u2 ) = oo. 
(72-0 
(12) 
If W = 0 and u2 > 0, then holding inventory Ufitil the due date and delivering orders 
late are the only possible outcomes. Also, the variance cost function approaches zero as 
W becomes large. When inventory and tardy costs exceed the variance cost function, the 
bounds of the distribution will tend to approach the window. The probability of holding 
inventory and delivering orders late will approach zero. This suggests that the bounds 
bending away from the window will occur for a variety of flow time distributions. 
The fact that the variance and allowance converge to the mean flow time for the 
linear function also seems reasonable for other flow time distributions. If W = 0 and 
u2 = 0, c( u2 ) must be finite, and the slope of c( u2 ) must have a small enough slope to 
make variance elimination more attractive than holding inventory or delivering orders late. 
As long as the marginal variance cost is sufficiently small relative to holding, tardy and 
penalty costs, variance reduction would minimize cost as the window duration decreased. 
The fact that the bounds are straight lines when the uniform distribution is used would 
not be true for other distributions. 
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6. Conclusions 
Buyers, for whom on-time delivery is critical, need a method of creating incentives for 
suppliers. To be effective, these methods must be analyzed with respect to how suppliers 
will respond to them. The incentives should ideally result in supplier behavior that has 
three important attributes. First, the supplier's on-time delivery performance should im-
prove: the proportion of on-time delivery should increase and the expected tardiness should 
decrease. Second, the supplier's variance of flow time should decrease. Third, the supplier 
should not hold additional inventory in order to make the increased timeliness possible. 
These outcomes are sought because they result in improved individual firm performance 
and improved supply chain efficiency. 
This paper considers whether delivery windows achieve these outcomes. A mathe-
matical model of the effect of buyer-specified delivery windows on the supplier's flow time 
variance, flow time allowance, inventory, expected tardiness, and probability of on-time 
delivery is presented. Using delivery windows may have the effect of making the supplier's 
preferred action to reduce flow time allowance and variance. However, depending on the 
suppli~r's cost function to control variance, improved inventory levels and on-time delivery 
may not result. For uniformly distributed flow times and linear variance cost function with 
moderate slope, all of the desired outcomes occur except the proportion of on-time deliv-
eries stays constant. When the slope is too large the solution becomes either undefined or 
imaginary. For a uniform distribution and exponential cost functions, only one of the three 
outcomes occurs. The variance of flow time is reduced, but inventory and on-time delivery 
actually get worse. In one of the scenario presented here, improving the predictability of 
flow time may not lead to more timely delivery or inventory reduction. 
This research suggests that using delivery windows may be effective for inducing sup-
plier variance reduction but may not result in more timely deliveries with less supplier 
inventory. Several research questions remain unanswered. What is the typical shape of 
variance cost functions? Are moderately sloped linear functions common? If not, what 
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method can be used to achieve all three outcomes? Selecting a method to improve the per-
formance and efficiency of buyer-supplier relationships is not simple and could be counter-
intuitive. Continued research that attempts to generalize and broaden managerial insight 
into how buyer-supplier relationships should be structured for efficient outcomes would be 
of interest. 
7. Appendix 
To show that the supplier's expected costs result in a minimum, the Hessian matrix, 
H, must be positive semidefinite. The Hessian matrix for both the exponential and linear 
variance cost functions are present below. 
7.1. Convexity of Expected Costs for Exponential Variance Cost Function 
(13) 
IHI = o{{3 + P)W2 98(o + {3 + P) 
4R4 + R5 E E 
{14) 
For the Hessian matrix to be positive semidefinite the determinant and the diagonal 
elements of the Hessian matrix must be non-negative. The second partial derivative of 
X,(A, R) with respect to A and Rare positive since all of the parameters and variables 
are assumed to be either non-negative or positive. The determinant IHI is non-negative 
for the same reason. 
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7.2. Convexity of Expected Costs for Linear Variance Cost Function 
The supplier's expected costs are convex in the allowance and the range of flow times. 
The Hessian matrix and its determinant are 




This Hessian matrix is also positive semidefinite. The determinant and the diagonal 
elements of the Hessian matrix are non-negative by assumption. 
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Table 1: Changes in Delivery Performance Measures as Window 
Width Decreases for Two Variance Cost Functions 
Exponential Linear 
Measures Variance Cost Function Variance Cost Function 
Variance decreases, bounds of distri- decreases, bounds of 
bution remain close to the distribution remain propor-
allowance and window until tional to the allowance and 
window is small. window. 
Duration Inventory increases for supplier decreases for supplier 
is held decreases for buyer decreases for buyer 
Flow Time Allowance decreases decreases 
Probability of On-Time decreases, especially for remains constant 
Delivery small window 
Expected Tardiness mcreases decreases 
supplier holds 
inventory 
Supplier incurs ___ _ 
tardy costs 
buyer holds ____ _ 
inventory 








FIGURE 1: How the relationship between a uniform flow time 
distribution, the allowance A, and the window W affects 












FIGURE 2: As the window duration decreases, the 
bounds of the distribution bend away from 
the window 
graph uses specific values for equations 3 & 4: a • 10, 










FIGURE 3: As the window duration decreases, the 
bounds and allowance converge. 
graph uses specific values for equations 8 & 9: a • 10, 
p = 15, 9 -= 5, J.1. • 15, P • 5, M • 200 
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